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national governments. The results show that the labour market externality will influence the 
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1. Introduction 
There is, today, a relatively large literature which explores the connection between labour 
market distortions and environmental policy. This reflects that environmental policy may 
influence the outcome on the labour market, and if the latter is characterized by imperfect 
competition, the welfare effects that originate from the labour market may be significant. One 
strand of this literature analyzes how labour market distortions operate simultaneously with 
environmental externalities, and how environmental tax reforms may improve welfare in the 
presence of unemployment.
1 Another characterizes the environmental policy in the context of 
an optimal tax and expenditure structure.
2
    The design of environmental and fiscal policy typically depends on the context within 
which these decisions are made. Earlier studies of environmental policy and labour market 
distortions have dealt with unified economies in which there is no distinction between 
different levels in the public sector. This is somewhat surprising, considering that countries, 
or unions of countries, have a multi-level decision structure, where different levels of 
governments choose different policy instruments. Compared with a unified country, the multi-
level decision structure may have important implications for the design of policies because 
different government levels may (i) have different objectives and (ii) may have access to 
different policy instruments. Usually, (i) is interpreted to mean that local governments are 
only concerned with domestic welfare whereas the federal level is concerned with the welfare 
in all localities. In the presence of transboundary environmental externalities, this means that 
environmental policies (e.g. emission targets) should be determined at the federal level, 
whereas the implementation of these policies can be left to the local governments. A possible 
example is the European Union (EU), where emission targets for e.g. greenhouse gases are 
determined at the European level, whereas the implementation is left to the member countries. 
As for (ii), it is related to the argument that some federal structures, such as EU, can be 
characterized as decentralized federations because the federal government is weak relative to 
the lower-level (national) governments. This is usually interpreted to mean that the federal 
government only has access to a restricted set of policy instruments, and that the national 
governments act as first-movers vis-à-vis the federal government.
 In this paper, I follow the second line of research 
by considering environmental policy as part of an optimal tax and expenditure problem. 
3
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1998), Bovenberg and van der 
Ploeg (1998), Parry et al (1999), and Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (2001). 
  The weak federation 
structure contrasts to the approach used in most earlier studies on economic federations, 
2 See, e.g., Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996) and Aronsson (2005). 
3 See, e.g. Caplan and Silva (1999).   3 
where it is the federal government which acts as a first-mover towards the local governments. 
The weak federation structure will have important implications for how the lower-level 
governments design their policies since these can be used to influence the federal government. 
This means that in a weak federation, there will be additional motives underlying the 
environmental and fiscal policies chosen by a lower-level government. In spite of the fact that 
decentralized federation approach is practically relevant because it may be a good 
approximation of the decision structure within EU, there are only a few earlier studies which 
have analyzed environmental policies in the context of a decentralized economic federation.
4
    The discussion above implies that if there exists other externalities between countries, in 
addition to those attributable to the environment, then the federal level in a decentralized 
federation may lack the proper policy instruments to fully internalize these other 
inefficiencies. One source which may generate additional externalities between countries is 
the labour market. If the labour markets between countries are connected, e.g. due to 




    The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to analyze fiscal policy in the presence of 
environmental and labour market externalities within a decentralized federation structure. I 
assume that the environmental damage, which is transboundary, is caused by the use of a 
´dirty´ input in the production. The federation consists of two countries and two levels of 
 If there is imperfect competition on the labour market, this mechanism 
will give rise to a wage bargaining externality between the countries. In this paper the 
externality arises because the firms use the threat of moving abroad as a tool to moderate 
wage claims. The credibility of the threat depends on how large the potential outside profit is 
which, in turn, depends on the wage level in the other countries. As such, any policy 
undertaken by the government in one country which affects the domestic wage will also 
indirectly influence the bargained wage in the other countries. Although the individual 
countries are not likely to coordinate their fiscal policies, the federal level (most likely) 
recognizes the wage bargaining externality and wants to internalize it. Then, even if the 
federal level lacks the proper policy instruments to do this (which clearly is the case if the 
federal level only determines emission targets), the federal level may, nevertheless, let its 
policy instrument(s) be influenced by the wage bargaining e xternality. This will, in turn, have 
implications for the fiscal policies implemented by the national governments. To my 
knowledge, this link has not been explored in the previous literature. 
                                                 
4 See Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan et al (2000), Aronsson et al (2006) and Persson (2008). 
5 See Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a).   4 
governments, where the federal level determines environmental targets to be implemented by 
the national governments. On the national level, the governments raise tax revenue to finance 
the provision of a national public good. Each national government’s problem is solved within 
a two-type framework
6
    The attempt to combine decentralized fiscal federalism with environmental externalities in 
the presence of unemployment is particularly interesting from a European perspective. There 
are several reasons for this. First, earlier theoretical work often uses the European Union as an 
example of a decentralized federation because of the relative weakness of the supranational 
structure in EU vis-à-vis the member countries. Second, the European Union plays an 
important role for environmental policy as it decides upon targets for environmental damage 
which are then to be implemented at the national level. Third, several European countries 
have experienced high unemployment levels for a number of years, possibly due to the 
influence of trade unions on wage formation. The first two points are often used to motivate 
studies dealing with redistribution in economic federations with decentralized leadership 
while the last point is used to motivate theoretical analyses of environmental policy in 
economies with unemployment. As such, this study brings these ideas together and to my 
knowledge, this has not been done before. 
 where the set of available policy instruments includes a nonlinear 
labour income tax, a commodity tax, a tax on factor inputs and a profit tax. On the labour 
market, trade unions influence wage formation, and this distorts the allocation of labour 
between two production sectors, and it also gives rise to a wage bargaining externality 
between countries. I characterize the optimal policy at the federal level and show how the 
wage bargaining externality will influence the emission targets chosen by the federal 
government. I then proceed to characterize the optimal tax policy at the national level.  
    This paper is primarily related to three fields; (i) optimal nonlinear taxation in the presence 
of labour market distortions, (ii) environmental policy under optimal nonlinear taxation and 
(iii) environmental policy in decentralized economic federations. Previous studies on optimal 
nonlinear taxation in the presence of labour market distortions have focused on a variety of 
issues. Fuest and Huber (1997), and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b) analyze the effects of 
labour-tax progression on employment and welfare. The contribution of both papers is to 
characterize the determinants of tax progression. In the former study, the welfare maximizing 
degree of tax progression is influenced by the wage elasticity of labour demand and the 
distribution of bargaining power, whereas in the latter study, it is shown that the argument for 
                                                 
6 See Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).   5 
progressive income taxation depends on whether the hours of work are chosen by the 
individual workers or by the union. Other studies are Marceau and Boadway (1994) and 
Aronsson and Sjögren (2003), both of which incorporate a two-type model into a framework 
where there is unemployment in equilibrium. 
    Earlier studies dealing with environmental policy under optimal nonlinear taxation are 
commonly based on the assumption that the labour market is competitive.
7
    This paper is also related to the literature on environmental policy in the context of 
decentralized federations. To my knowledge, there are very few studies which have addressed 
this issue. Silva and Caplan (1997), and Caplan and Silva (1999) analyze different kinds of 
transboundary environmental problems and associated policies to solve them. They consider a 
federal structure involving one federal level and several lower level governments, where the 
policy instruments differ between levels. They characterize the environmental policy 
outcomes depending on whether the federation is centralized or decentralized, and depending 
on how the control over policy instruments is distributed between the two levels of 
government. In Aronsson et al (2006), the federal government chooses environmental targets 
to be implemented by the national governments. The national governments will then use their 
policy instruments to influence the emission target. It is shown that this provides an argument 
for using distortionary labor income taxation and that the commodity tax does will no longer 
satisfy the additivity property. 
 One exception is 
Aronsson (2005) who analyzes environmental policy in the presence of a labour market 
distortion caused by union-firm wage bargaining. The policy instruments are a general income 
tax function and linear commodity taxes, and his main contribution is to characterize how the 
interaction between the labor market distortion and the environmental damage influences the 
optimal tax policy. 
    Compared with the papers discussed above, this paper contributes to the literature in 
primarily two ways. The first is by characterizing environmental and tax policy in the 
presence of labour market distortions within the context of a decentralized economic 
federation. This makes it possible to analyze how the tax structure at the national level is 
affected by the national government’s incentive to influence both the labour market distortion 
and the central government’s policies. In particular, it is possible to study how these different 
motives behind taxation interact when it comes to designing the (national government’s) 
optimal tax policy. The second contribution is to explicitly incorporate the wage bargaining 
                                                 
7 See, e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), Cremer et al (2001) and Cremer and Gahvari (2001).   6 
externality mentioned above into the framework of a federation and analyze how this feature 
affects the central government’s policy decisions. In particular, it means that since the central 
government lacks a direct instrument by which to internalize the wage bargaining externality, 
the presence of this externality will affect the central government’s choices of emission 
targets. 
    The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I present the outcome of private 
decisions and characterize the equilibrium. Section 3 concerns optimal policy, both by the 
central government and the national governments. The paper is summarized in section 4. 
 
 
2. The Model 
Consider an economic federation which is made up of two identical member countries
8
 
 and a 
federal government. Each member country consists of four types of decision makers; 
consumers, firms, trade unions and a national government. Each country produces two goods, 
c and x, which are traded on the world market at a fixed price. 
 
2.1 The Consumers 
The consumers’ preferences can be described by the following utility function 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ,, U ucxz G D D ϕ = +Θ + +Γ         (1) 
 
where c and x are consumption goods, and z is leisure which is defined as  zhl = − , where h is 
a fixed time endowment and l the hours of work. The term G is a national public good, D is 
environmental damage generated within the country and 
* D  is environmental damage coming 
from the other country (in what follows, all variables indexed by "*" refer to the other 
country). The function  ( ) D ϕ   captures the utility loss of domestically generated 
environmental damage whereas  ( )
* D Γ  captures the utility loss of foreign environmental 
damage. The functions  ( ) ,, ucxz and  ( ) G Θ  are increasing in their respective arguments, 
whereas  ( ) D ϕ and  ( )
* D Γ  are decreasing in D and 
* D , respectively. 
                                                 
8 The number of countries making up the federation is of no importance. All results derived below carry over to a 
framework with more than two member countries.   7 
    Each country is made up of three types of consumers; a firm-owner and two types of 
workers, where the latter differ in terms of their productivity on the labour market. The 
private goods are produced in two separate production sectors using two separate 
technologies, and the productivity difference between the workers shows up in the production 
of good x. This difference is reflected in a productivity indicator which will be part of the 
production function for good x  to be described below. A worker of type 1, has low 
productivity, indicated by 
1 a , while a type 2 worker has high productivity, indicated by 
2 a , 
where 
21 aa > . These productivity levels will influence the before-tax wage rate, 
i w , which 
ability type i,  1, 2 i = , receives if he/she is employed in sector x. I assume that 
21 ww > . There 
are 
i M  workers of type i, out of which 
i N  are employed in sector x while 
ii MN −  are 
employed in sector c. In the latter sector, both types of workers have the same productivity. 
This means that all workers who are employed in that sector receive the same before-tax 
wage, 
c w . 
    The maximization problem facing a worker who receives the wage 
k w ,  1, 2, kc = , can be 
solved in two stages. First, the utility maximization problem is solved conditional on the 
hours of work. This involves maximizing equation (1) w.r.t. 
k c   and 
k x   subject to 
kk k b c qx = +  , where 
k b  is treated as a fixed post-tax income. Good c is a numeraire good and 
its price is normalized to one, whereas the consumer price of good x is given by  q pt = + , 
where p is a fixed world market producer price and t a commodity tax. Solving this problem  
produces the following conditional demand and indirect utility functions 
 
( ) ,,
k kk c cqb z =           (2) 
( ) ,,
k kk x xqb z =           (3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ,,
k kk V vqb z G D D ϕ = +Θ + +Γ       (4) 
 
    In the second stage, the hours of work are derived by maximizing the conditional indirect 
utility function with respect to 
k l  subject to the budget constraint  ( )
kk k b I TI = − , where 
k kk I wl =  is gross income and  ( )
k TI  is the income tax function. The first-order condition for 
this problem is written 
   8 
( ) 10
k kk k




b V Vb = ∂∂  and  /
k kk
z V Vz = ∂∂ , and where  /
k kk
I T TI = ∂∂  is the marginal income 
tax rate. Conditional on the income tax schedule, this first-order condition implicitly defines 
the labour supply as a function of the pre-tax wage rate and as a function of the parameters of 
the income tax function (for notational convenience, these parameters are suppressed); 
( )
kk l lw = . 
    Turning to the firm-owners, I normalize their number to one. The firm-owner does not 
work, which means that his/her budget constraint is written 
ff f b c qx = + , where 
f b  is the 
firm-owner’s post-tax income, and where the superindex f refers to the firm-owner. The 
solution to the firm-owner’s problem of choosing 
f c  and 
f x  to maximize the utility produces 
the following conditional demand and indirect utility functions 
 
( ) ,
ff c cqb =           (6) 
( ) ,
ff x xqb =           (7) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ,
ff V vqb G D D ϕ = +Θ + +Γ         (8) 
 
Post-tax income is given by  ( ) 1
f bs =−Π , where  Π is the gross profit and s a profit tax paid 
by the firm.  
    The presence of a nonworking household which receives all profit income is a strong 
assumption. An alternative would be to assume that all agents in the economy own shares in 
the firm and thereby also receive the profit income. However, this would introduce 
distributional concerns into the model which would complicate the mathematical equations to 
be derived below without providing any new insight into the incentives influencing policy in 
the presence of environmental externalities and imperfect competition in the labour market. 





   9 
2.2 Production 
Production takes place in two separate sectors, each made up of identical competitive firms. 
The number of firms in each sector is normalized to one. In sector x, the production function 
is written  ( )
11 22 ,, F aL aL E , where 
i L   is total employment of ability type i  and  E  is an 
environmentally ‘dirty’ input, henceforth referred to as energy. Total employment is measured 
as the hours of work per employee, 
i l , times the number of employed workers, 
i N . The 
production function is increasing and concave in each argument, and the production is 
characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
9
i L
 The two types of labour are weak substitutes in 
production whereas energy is complementary in production with both types of labour. The 
firm's objective is to choose   and E to maximize the profit 
 
( )
11 22 11 22 ,, pF a L a L E w L w L E θ Π=− − −       (9) 
 
where θ  is the price of energy. It is assumed that the supply of energy is infinitely elastic. 
This means that, without loss of generality, the marginal cost of producing energy can be 
normalized to zero, so that the energy price paid by the firm equals the energy tax. This 
simplification is not important for the qualitative results to be derived below. 
    Profit maximization means choosing 
i L   and  E  such that  ( ) /
ii i w ap F L = ∂∂   and 
( ) / pF E θ =∂∂. These first-order conditions implicitly define the following factor demand 




ii L Lwwθ = ,  ( )
12 ,, E Ewwθ = ,  ( )
12 ,, wwθ Π=Π   (10) 
 
where the exogenous terms 
1 a  and 
2 a  have been suppressed. It is assumed that the profit is 
taxed at the firm level at the rate s, which means that the net profit is given by ( ) 1 s −Π . 
    The numeraire good is produced in a separate sector, c, with a linear technology which uses 
labour as the only production factor. In sector c, type 1 and type 2 workers have the same 
                                                 
9 The reason for assuming decreasing returns to scale is that the labour market is dominated by trade unions, and 
to be able to characterize the wage bargain between the union and the firm, the labour demand function needs to 
be well-defined.   10 
productivity
10 c w , which means that both ability types receive the same constant wage rate,  . It 
is assumed that sector c is a low-paid sector which means that 




2.3 The Labour Market 
As mentioned above, each country is made up of two production sectors. In sector x, the wage 
is determined in a bargain between the firm and two type specific trade unions whereas in 
sector c, the labour market functions competitively in the sense that the demand and the 
supply of labour are equalized. 
    In sector x, each ability type is organized by an ability-specific trade union.
11
1 w
 The wage 
formation process is decentralized in the sense that both the firm and the two trade unions 
treat the policy instruments of the government, as well as the output price and the wage in the 
competitive sector, as exogenous. The wage rates   and 
2 w  are determined simultaneously 
in two separate negotiations, and in each bargain the other wage rate is treated as exogenous. 
To characterize the bargaining outcomes, it is necessary to make an assumption of what the 
union objective functions look like. Following Oswald (1993), it is assumed that the workers 
of both types can be ranked according to exogenous seniority rules and that the decisive union 
member of ability-type i is the worker with median seniority. The objective of the median 
union member in each trade union is to achieve the highest possible private utility, conditional 
on that he/she remains employed in sector x. This means that the objective of union i is to 
maximize 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ,,
i ii ii i V v q wl T wl h l G D D ϕ  = − − +Θ + +Γ      (11) 
 
                                                 
10  The reason for using such a simple technology in the production of the numeraire good is analytical 
convenience.  A more general formulation would complicate the calculations without providing any novel 
results. 
11 In practice, union membership reflects a variety of factors such as ability, industry and occupation. In this 
model, I have chosen to organize the workers on the basis of their ability, since I do not distinguish between 
different parts of the production sector. Another possibility would be to assume that both ability types are 
organized by the same type of union. As long as the wage rates chosen by such a union reflects ability in the 
sense that higher ability means a higher wage, the description of how the workers are organized into unions does 
not affect the results to be derived below.   11 
subject to  ( )
ii l lw = . If no contract is signed between the union and the firm, the union 
members will leave sector x and seek employment in sector c. This means that each union 
member’s fall-back utility is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ,,
c cc cc c V v qwl T wl h l G D D ϕ  = − − +Θ + +Γ      (12) 
 
where  ( )
cc l lw = . As for the firm, it has the option to move the production abroad, in which 
case the fall-back gross profit is given by  ( )
* 1* 2* * ,, wwθ Π= Π . The move abroad is 
associated with a fixed moving cost, q, which means that the net fall-back profit is given by 
( )
** 1 sq − Π− . 
    By defining 
ic VV −  and  ( ) ( )
** 11 s sq − Π− − Π +  to be union i's and the firm's respective 
rents from the bargain, the outcome of the bargain will be the wage that maximizes the 
following Nash product 
 




i ic vv s s q
β β −
 Ω = − − Π− − Π +        (13) 
 
where 
i β  is trade union i’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the firm. Since the firm bargains with 
the two trade unions simultaneously, the first-order conditions for 
i w ,  1, 2 i = , can be written 
as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
** 1 1 1 11 0
i
i i ii i i i c
Ib i T lv s s q s L v v
w
ββ
∂Ω  = − −Π −− Π + −− − − =  ∂
  (14) 
 
where equation (5) and Hotelling’s lemma have been used to simplify the first-order 
condition. It is assumed that the second order-condition  /0
ii w ∂Ω ∂ <  is fulfilled for  1, 2 i = , 
and for the analysis below, observe that conditional on 
2 w , the bargained wage 
1 w   is 
decreasing in 
* Π , and vice versa. This basically reflects that if the firm’s outside option is 
improved, the firm may be tougher in the wage negotiations. 
    To simplify the analysis below, it will be convenient to write equation (14) such that the 
wage rates become functions of variables that are directly affected by the national   12 
government’s policy instruments. As will be shown below, the problem facing the national 
government will be written such that 
f b , 
k b  and 
k l  are interpretable as decision variables for 
the national government (via which the tax and expenditure policies can be derived). 
Therefore, to derive wage equations that are functions of 
f b , 
k b  and 
k l  (instead of s, 
k T  and 
k
I T ), note that  ( ) 1
f bs =−Π  and that equation (5) implies ( ) 1/
kk k k
Ib z Tv vw −= . Substituting 
these expressions into equation (14) produces the following modified first-order condition for 
i w  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
** 1 11 0
ii i i
f i ii c z
ii
lv




∂Ω  = −− Π + −− − − =  ∂

    (15) 
 
In accordance with the assumption that the bargaining parties obey the second-order sufficient 
conditions for a maximum, it will be assumed that  /0
ii w ∂Ω ∂ <  . By observing that 
i v  is a 
function of 
i b , 
i z  and q, equation (15) implies that the wage rate 
i w  can be written as a 
function 
 
( ) ( )
1 2 12 * * , , , , , , , ,,1
i if c c w wb bbblll t s θ =−Π       (16) 
 
for  1, 2 i = , where the notation of fixed terms are omitted. 
    It is assumed that the workers who do not become employed in sector x leave that sector 
and seek employment in sector c. Since the labour market functions competitively in sector c, 
everyone will find a job there. Hence, there will be no unemployment in this model. Rather, 
the effect of trade unions is to push up the wage rates in sector x above that in sector c, 
meaning that the allocation of labour between the two sectors becomes inefficient. 
 
 
3. Optimal Policy 
The environmental damage facing the residents in each country is generated by the use of 
energy in the production. This means that the environmental damages are given by  DE =  
and 
** DE = , respectively. Within the federation, it is the central government that determines 
emission targets for D and 
* D , and these targets are then to be implemented by the individual 
countries.   13 
    The wage formation process produces an additional externality. This externality is  a 
consequence of the assumption that the firm uses the threat of moving production abroad as a 
tool to moderate wage claims. The credibility of this threat depends on the size of the outside 
profit; the larger the outside profit, the stronger will be the firm’s bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the trade union. This has an important implication for fiscal policy: any (tax) policy which 
affects the domestic profit level will also affect the outcome of the wage bargain in the other 
country. As long as the fiscal policy is not coordinated between the national governments, this 
mechanism will imply that there is an uninternalized international wage bargaining externality 
in equilibrium. Although each national government does not take into account that its policy 
affects the other country, the federal government does. It will, therefore, incorporate the 
international wage bargaining externality into its decision problem. 
    It is assumed that the order of decision-making is such that the public policies at both the 
federal and the national level is determined before the private agents make their decisions. As 
such, the federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the private agents in both 
countries whereas the national government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the domestic 
private agents. In addition, the federal government treats the policies chosen by the national 
governments as exogenous, but for two exceptions (see below). Each national government, in 
turn, treats the policy of the other national government as exogenous, whereas both national 
governments act as first movers vis-a-vis the federal government (the latter is a consequence 
of the assumption that the federation is decentralized). 
    To be able to characterize the policy determined within the federation, I will first describe 
the problem (without solving it) facing the national government because this is needed to 
understand the problem facing the federal government. Next, I solve the federal government’s 
problem and this solution is then used to derive reaction functions for the policy instruments 
chosen at the federal level. These reaction functions are then incorporated into each national 
government’s problem,  after which I solve this problem and characterize the optimal solution 
at the national level. 
 
 
3.1 The National Government 
Each government has a utilitarian objective function. This means that the objective of the 
national government is to maximize the sum of utilities inside the country, i.e. 
   14 
nn
n
W NV =∑           (17) 
 
where  1, 2, , n cf = ,  ( )
c ii
i N MN = − ∑  and  1
f N = . Each national government collects tax 
revenues via the profit tax, the labour income tax, the commodity tax and the energy tax. 
These revenues are used to finance redistribution and the expenditure on a national public 
good, G. It is assumed that good x can be converted to the public good without cost and on a 
one-to-one basis. This means that the national government purchases G units of good x on the 





N T s E t N x pG θ + Π+ + − = ∑∑       (18) 
 
Note that by choosing the parameters of the income tax function  ( )
k TI , the national 
government can induce any desired combination of 
k b  and 
k l . As such, this means 
k b  and 
k l , and the parameters of  ( )
k TI , constitute two equivalent sets of policy instruments and in 
this paper, it is more convenient to use 
k b  and 
k l  instead of the parameters of the tax function 
as decision variables of the government. Similarly, also 
f b  and s constitute two equivalent 
policy instruments, and I will use the former as a decision variable of the national 
government. This means that the national government’s problem will be written in terms of 
the following vector of decision variables; ( ) , , , ,,
f kk b b l tG θ . By combining equation (18) 
with  ( )
k kk kk b wl T wl = −   and  ( ) 1
f bs =−Π , and by using equation (9) together with 




11 22 ,, 0
c cc n n n n
nn
pF a L a L E w N l t N x N b pG + + − −= ∑∑     (19) 
 
    The informational assumptions are conventional. The government can observe an 
individual’s gross income, 
k I , but not his/her ability type. This means that the government 
must choose the policy such that a high-ability type does not wish to behave as a low-ability 
type and vice versa. Since the government has a desire to redistribute towards low-income   15 
groups, it has become the convention in the literature to focus on the case where the high-
ability type may mimic the gross income of the low-ability type. For a type 2 worker to have 
the same gross income as type 1, he/she must determine his/her labour input such that 
21 ˆ ll φ = , where 
12 / ww φ =  is the wage ratio, and where "^" denotes a variable associated with 
the mimicker. This means that the self-selection constraint that may bind is written 
22 ˆ VV ≥ , 
where  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 12 * ˆ ˆ ,, V vqb h l G D D ϕ = − +Θ + +Γ       (20) 
 
Furthermore, since workers who are not employed in sector x become employed in sector c, 
where they earn the gross income 
cc wl, there are potentially two more self-selection 
constraints that may bind 
 
( ) ( )
22 2 ,, ,, /
c cc vqb h l vqb h wl w −≥ −         (21) 
( ) ( )
11 1 ,, ,, /
c cc vqb h l vqb h wl w −≥ −         (22) 
 
However, it will be assumed that the wage in the low-paid sector is sufficiently low never to 
make mimicking of this type an attractive choice. This means that the potential self-selection 
constraints in (21) and (22) will not be binding. 
    Finally, the government also recognizes that the gross wage for ability type  1, 2 i = , is 
determined by equation (16). 
 
 
3.2 The Federal Government 




constraints facing the federal government are the behavioural equations of the private sector 
in each country, and the environmental damage functions    and 
** DE = . These 
equalities imply that there is a one-to-one relationship between the use of energy and the 
environmental damage. It is also assumed that the federal government recognizes, and takes 
                                                 
12 An alternative, and possibly more realistic approach within an EU context, would be to model the federal 
policy as the outcome of a bargain between the member countries. Although the first-order conditions defining 
the optimal policy at the federal level would become more complex, one can show that the qualitative results 
derived in this paper would still remain.   16 
into account, the self-selection constraint in each country. The direct decision variables are the 
emission targets D and 
* D  (and hence also E and 
* E ). To solve the federal government’s 
problem, I need to make two assumptions. These regard (i) how the federal government 
expects the national governments to implement the emission targets and (ii) how the federal 
government expects the national governments to respond to a change in tax revenue. 
Assumption (i) is needed to determine a trade-off at the federal level between the benefits of 
lower emissions and the welfare costs, in terms of reduced private consumption, associated 
with these reductions. In principle, each national government could use any policy instrument, 
or combination of policy instruments, to implement the emission target. As such, there are 
many possible responses at the national level but I have to choose one of them in order to be 
able to solve the federal government’s problem. Therefore, I choose the most direct link, 
which is to say that the federal government expects each emission target to be implemented at 
the national level via the policy instrument which directly influences emissions, namely the 
production tax, θ . As for (ii), I assume that the central government expects that a change in 
tax revenue will be met by a corresponding change in the provision of the local public good,
13
    The Lagrangian corresponding to the federal government's problem is written (the 
superindex "F" refers to the federal government) 
 
G. All other national decision variables are treated as exogenous by the federal government. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
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* * 1* 2* * 1* 2* * * * , , , , , , , ,,
f c cF
i
b bbblll t θ  Π  ∑
  (23) 
 
where 
F λ , 
* F λ , 
F γ , 
* F γ , 
F µ  and 
* F µ  are Lagrange multipliers associated with the self-
selection  constraints, the national budget constraints and the environmental damages, 
                                                 
13 Assumption (i) is in line with Aronsson et al (2006), whereas assumption (ii) is common in the literature on 
fiscal federalism.   17 
respectively. The constraints associated with the Lagrange multipliers 
Fi ρ  and 
* Fi ρ  represent 
the wage equations for type 1 and type 2 workers in the two countries. 
    The formulation in equation (23) is convenient as it makes it possible to identify the 
determinants of the shadow prices that the federal government attaches to the national budget 
constraints and the labour market imperfections. The additional (and artificial) decision 
variables corresponding to these constraints are G, 
* G , 
i w  and 
* i w . In addition to choosing D, 
* D , G, 
* G , 
i w  and 
* i w , assumption (i) implies that also the energy tax will be viewed as 
decision variable by the federal government. To separate the federal government’s preferred 
choice of the energy tax from that of the national government, I label the federal 
government’s preferred choice with the superindex “F”, i.e. 
F θ . In equilibrium, the federal 
government’s preferred choice will coincide with that actually chosen by the national 
government. The first-order conditions are presented in the Appendix. 
    To characterize the emission target for D, observe that it is implicitly determined by the 
first-order condition for the federal government’s “choice” of the energy tax. The first-order 
condition for 













Φ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= −+






Fi i c i c
F
VV
T T tx x
γ
−  Φ= + − + −          (25) 
 
The term 
Fi Φ  measures the welfare effect that will arise if a worker of type  1, 2 i =  goes from 
working in sector c to working in sector x. This welfare effect is made up of two parts. First, 
each worker who goes from being employed in sector c  to be employed in sector x 
experiences a direct utility gain equal to 
ic VV − . Second, the net effect on the tax revenue is 
given by the terms inside the square brackets. Since workers of both types have a higher gross 
income in sector x than in sector c, the tax revenue effect is likely to be positive, in which case 
Fi Φ  is positive.  
    To interpret equation (24), observe first that anything that works in the direction of 
increasing (decreasing) 
F θ , will induce the federal government to set a tighter (less tight)   18 
emission target for D. Equation (24) shows that three factors influence 
F θ , and hence D. The 
first is  /
FF µγ , which appears in the tax formula as a corrective measure to internalize the 
externality. The shadow price, 
F µ , is equal to the sum of the marginal disutility of D over all 
agents in both countries 
 
** F nn n n
DD
nn
NV N V µ = −− ∑∑         (26) 
 
    The remaining two terms in equation (24) are directly linked to the imperfection on the 
labour market. The middle term, which is negative as long as  /0
i L θ ∂ ∂< and  /0 E θ ∂ ∂<, 
captures that a tighter emission target (which means that 
F θ  is higher) has a direct and 
negative effect on the level of employment. This provides the federal government with an 
incentive to set the emission target less tight. The last term on the right hand side of equation 
(24) reflects that the energy tax indirectly affects welfare via the wage rates 
1 w  and 
2 w . Since 
the shadow price associated with the labour market distortion for ability type i, 
Fi ρ , (most 
likely) will be positive, the sign of the last term in (24) depends on whether  /
i w θ ∂∂  is 
positive or negative. If  /0
i w θ ∂ ∂>, the final term in (24) is negative which means that the 
indirect effect via the wages will induce the federal government to set the emission target less 
tight. The argument goes in the opposite direction if  /0
i w θ ∂ ∂<. 
    Since the shadow price associated with the labour market imperfection plays an important 
role for the federal government’s policy, it is instructive to see how it is determined. In the 
Appendix, I show that for ability type j,  1, 2 j = ,  /
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lw w w w
ρ µ λφ ρ
θ
γ γγ γ
 Φ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂Π
= − −− − +  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂Π ∂  ∑∑   (27) 
 
Equation (27) shows the shadow price of a (small) increase in 
j w  is made up of four parts. 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (27) is the direct welfare cost of a higher 
wage which follows because the level of employment in sector x is reduced. Turning to the 
second term on the right hand, note that it is nonzero if the environmental tax deviates from 
the shadow price of the environmental externality. This reflects that if 
F θ   is set below 
/
FF µγ , then the environmental externality is not fully internalized. In that case a higher   19 
wage, which has a negative effect on the use of energy, helps to reduce the use of energy 
towards the preferred level. This is welfare improving and contributes to reduce  /
Fi F ργ .  If, 
on the other hand,  /
F FF θ µγ > , the opposite argument applies. The third term on the right 
hand side reflects the self-selection constraint. Since 
1 /0 w φ ∂∂>  it follows that a higher 
wage for the low-ability type will relax the self-selection constraint, which is welfare 
improving and contributes to  reduce  /
Fi F ργ . On the other hand, since 
2 /0 w φ ∂∂< , the 
opposite argument applies for 
2 w . The final term on the right hand side of equation (27)  
appears as a consequence of the international wage bargaining externality. To interpret this 
term, observe that an increase in the domestic wage, 
j w , which has a negative effect on the 
domestic profit level, will push up the wage rates in the other country. This is due to the wage 
bargaining mechanism where the domestic profit level constitutes the fall-back profit for the 
firm in the other country. If the domestic profit level is reduced, the bargaining power of the 
firm in the other country is eroded which leads to higher wages, and reduced welfare in that 
country. Hence, the wage bargaining externality reinforces the welfare cost associated with 
high domestic wage rates. 
    Since  /
Fi F ργ   is part of the third term on the right hand side of equation (24), the 
international wage bargaining externality will influence the federal government’s choice of 
emission target. The following result is now readily available; 
 
Proposition 1: If  /0
i w θ ∂ ∂> ( /0
i w θ ∂ ∂<), the international wage bargaining externality 
will induce the federal government to set the emission target less tight (tighter) than 
otherwise. 
 
The result in Proposition 1 is potentially important because if the international wage 
bargaining externality is significant, then it may have a non-negligible impact on the design of 
the environmental target. A consequence of this argument is that even if the environmental 
targets are determined at the federal level, meaning that environmental damages in all 
localities are internalized in the decision making process, the environmental target may 
nevertheless deviate significantly from a first-best level. 
    Finally, observe that by combining the first-order conditions that define the federal 
government’s optimal policy, we can derive the following reaction functions for the 
environmental target levels   20 
 
( )
1 2 1 2 * 1* 2* * 1* 2* * * , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,
f c cf c c D b b b b l l l tb b b b l l l t α =     (28)
 
( )
* * 1 2 1 2 * 1* 2* * 1* 2* * * , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,
f c cf c c D b b b b l l l tb b b b l l l t α =     (29) 
 
where  ( ) 1
f bs =−Π   and  ( )
* ** 1
f bs = −Π   have been used to eliminate s  and 
* s . These 
reaction functions define the environmental targets as functions of national decision variables.  
 
 
3.3 The National Government’s Optimal Policy 
The national government’s problem is to maximize the welfare function in equation (17) 
subject to the budget constraint (19), the self-selection constraint 
22 ˆ VV ≥  and the wage 
equation (16) for  1, 2 i = . In addition, since each national government behaves as a first-mover 
vis-à-vis the federal government, the former observes, and incorporates into its decision 
problem, the reaction functions given by equations (28) and (29). Therefore, the Lagrangian 
corresponding to the national government’s problem can be written as 
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  (30) 
 
where κ  and 
* κ  are Lagrange multipliers associated with the reaction functions in equation 
(28) and (29). The first-order conditions are presented in the Appendix. 
    The national government’s policy will depend on the shadow  prices appearing in the 
Lagrangian. As such, it is important to recognize what factors influence their respective signs 
and sizes. Let us begin by deriving an expression for the term  / µγ  which is the shadow price 
of the environmental externality measured in terms of the federal government’s tax revenue. 
Define  /
n nn
Db D b MWP V V = −  to be a domestic consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for a   21 
small reduction in the domestic environmental damage. It is then straightforward to show that 
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    The first term on the right hand side of equation (31) is the sum of the marginal willingness 
to pay for a small reduction in the domestic environmental damage, while the second appears 
because a change in D will affect the self-selection. The third term captures the effect of the 
externality on the tax revenues. All these terms are well understood from earlier research,
14
    Turning to the fourth term in the first row of equation (31), it basically reflects that if 
 
and they will not be discussed any further.  
/0
in wb ∂ ∂≠ , then the labour market distortion will, by itself, influence  / µγ . The 
explanation is that if  /0
in wb ∂ ∂≠ , then the government has a different valuation of 
increasing 
n b  than the individual consumer. This, in turn, has implications for  / µγ . If, for 
example  /0
in wb ∂ ∂> , the government (ceteris paribus) attaches a lower value to an increase 
in 
n b  than the individual consumer. Therefore, the level of 
n b  and, hence the private utility, 
will be lower than otherwise. To ‘compensate’ the individual for this ‘utility loss’, the 
government can improve the environmental quality. As such, the government will attach a 
higher value to environmental quality than otherwise. The argument goes in the opposite 
direction if  /0
in wb ∂ ∂< . 
    Turning to the second row of equation (31), the first two terms correspond to effects 
derived in Aronsson et al (2006). To interpret these, observe first that the federal government 
is likely to set the environmental target for D tighter than the national government would 
prefer. The reason is, of course, that the federal government recognizes, and takes into 
account, that an increase in D has a direct, negative effect on the welfare in both countries, 
whereas the national government only recognizes the effect on domestic  welfare. 
Consequently, the target constraint will be binding (i.e.  0 κ > ), in which case  / κγ   in 
equation (31) reflects that the national government is forced to attach a higher value to the 
domestically environmental damage than it would otherwise have done. 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997).   22 
    The second term in the second row of equation (31) appears because the national 
government acts as a strategic leader towards the federal government. Since  0 κ > , a 
relaxation of the domestic environmental target will improve the domestic welfare. If 
/0
n b α ∂ ∂< , the strategic leadership effect provides the national government with an 
incentive to reduce disposable income by letting the consumers pay higher taxes than 
otherwise. The fact that the environmental constraint is relaxed when the consumers pay 
higher taxes is interpretable as an extra benefit associated with raising tax revenues which 
works to decrease γ  (where the latter is interpretable as the marginal cost of public funds in 
utility terms). Consequently, this has a positive effect on  / µγ . The argument goes in the 
opposite direction if  /0
n b α ∂ ∂> . 
    The last term on the second row of equation (31) reflects that the national government also 
uses its strategic leadership vis-à-vis the federal government to influence the environmental 
target for the other country. To interpret this effect, note first that 
* κ , which is the domestic 







V κ = < ∑           (32) 
 
This reflects that from the domestic government’s point of view, it is always welfare 
improving to tighten the emission target in the other country. Then, if 
* /0
n b α ∂ ∂< , the 
national government has an incentive to increase disposable income by letting the consumers 
pay lower taxes than otherwise. This implies an additional cost of raising tax revenue that 
works to increase γ  which, in turn, has a negative effect on  / µγ . The argument goes in the 
opposite direction if 
* /0
n b α ∂ ∂> . 
    Let us now turn to the shadow price associated with the labour market distortion,  /
j ργ . In 












 Φ∂ ∂ ∂
= − −− −  ∂ ∂∂  ∑       (33) 
 
By comparison, it follows that the terms on the right hand side of (33) correspond to, and can 
be given the same interpretation, as the first three terms on the right hand side of equation 
(27). Note, however, that the national government’s shadow price does not contain the last   23 
term in equation (27), which is related to the wage bargaining e xternality. This means that the 




3.3.1 The Energy Tax 
Let us now characterize the optimal tax and expenditure policy. Beginning with the energy 
tax, consider Proposition 2; 
 
Proposition 2: In the context of the decentralized federation, the energy tax implemented by 












Φ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= −+
∂∂ ∂∂ ∑∑      (34) 
 
Proof: See the Appe ndix. 
     
The difference between equations (25) and (34) refer to the shadow prices of the 
environmental and labour market externalities. In particular, since the national government 
does not recognize the interregional wage bargaining externality associated with the labour 
market distortion, the national government’s shadow price associated with the labour market 
distortion,  /
i ργ , will underestimate the full negative welfare effect of the labour market 
distortion. However, since the federal government takes the wage bargaining externality into 
account when it sets the emission targets, the national government is indirectly forced to 
recognize the wage bargaining externality because it is incorporated in the shadow price  / µγ  
(via κ ). Since  / µγ  appears in the tax formula for θ , it means that the energy tax will be 
used as an indirect instrument to (partially) internalize the international wage bargaining 
externality. 
    For the analysis below, let us substitute equation (34) into equation (33) to obtain the 
following expression for the national government’s shadow price of the wage bargaining 
externality 
   24 
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 Φ∂ Φ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= −+ − −  ∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂  ∑∑ ∑   (35) 
 
Equation (35) shows that  /
j ργ  is independent of  / µγ . 
 
 
3.3.2 The Commodity Tax 
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where the definitions in (36), as well as the first definition in (37), can be viewed as 
‘compensated’ effects of a change in the commodity tax. Now, consider Proposition 3; 
 
Proposition 3: In the context of the decentralized federation, the commodity tax implemented 















= −− − −
∆ ∆∂ ∆∂ ∆∂ ∑
 
      (38) 
 
Proof: See the Appe ndix. 
 
The important result in equation (38) is that because of the additivity property,
15
/ µγ
 the shadow 
price   does not appear in the tax formula for the commodity tax. This means that neither 
the environmental externality, nor the international wage bargaining externality (which is 
incorporated via  / µγ ), will influence the commodity tax structure. Rather, equation (38) 
shows that the commodity tax consists of four parts which are unrelated to any transboundary 
externality. The first term on the right hand side of equation (38) is related to self-selection 
                                                 
15 See Sandmo (1975).   25 
and has been discussed in, e.g. Edwards et al (1994). The second term is directly related to the 
domestic labour market distortion and if  /0
i wt ∂ ∂>  , this term is negative. It reflects that if 
the commodity tax increases, then trade union i compensates the median union member by 
opting for a higher wage. Since the increase in the wage has a negative effect on the welfare, 
the labour market distortion contributes to reduce the commodity tax. This link has been 
pointed out by Aronsson (2005). 
    The remaining two terms in equation (38) reflect that the national government uses the 
commodity tax as an instrument to influence the environmental targets. Beginning with the 
first, which is associated with the national government’s ability to influence the target for 
domestically generated pollution, it implies that if  /0 t α ∂ ∂<   ( /0 t α ∂ ∂>  ) then the national 
government has an incentive to tax commodity x less hard (harder) compared to when the 
national government is unable to act as a strategic leader vis-à-vis the federal government. By 
doing this, the target on domestic pollution can be relaxed which is welfare improving from 
the national government’s point of view. This link has been discussed in Aronsson et al 
(2006). 
    The last term in equation (38) reflects that the commodity tax structure may also influence 
emission target in the other country. Since it is always welfare improving from the national 
government’s point of view to reduce the emission from the other country, it follows that if 
* /0 t α ∂ ∂<  , the national government has an incentive to tax good x harder than otherwise 
because this leads to a tightening of the emission target for the other country. 
 
 
3.3.3 Labour Income Taxation 
The arguments behind the use of energy and commodity taxes also carry over to the incentive 
structure underlying marginal income taxation. To shorten the tax formulas to be discussed 
below, let  /
k kk
bz z b MRS V V =   denote the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
private income for  1, 2, kc = , and let 
2 22 ˆ ˆˆ / bz z b MRS V V =  denote the marginal rate of substitution 








































    (40)   26 
 
for ‘compensated’ effects on x, 
k w , a and 
* α  in response to an increase in the use of leisure. 
Consider Proposition 4; 
 
Proposition 4: In the context of the decentralized federation, the marginal income tax rates 
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Proposition 4 shows that there are basically four motives for setting a nonzero marginal 
income tax rate for the low-ability type employed in sector x; (i) relaxing the self-selection 
constraint, (ii) influencing the hours of work and the wage rate in order to alleviate the labour 
market distortion, (iii) to compensate the consumer for distortions created by the commodity 
tax, and (iv) influencing the emission targets chosen by the federal government. 
    Motive (i) is captured by the first term on the right hand side of equation (41) and one can 
show that 
12 ˆ 0 bz bz MRS MRS φ −> , which means that the presence of self-selection contributes to 
increase the marginal income tax rate. There is also an indirect self-selection effect, which is 
ambiguous in sign, because the hours of work will influence the wage ratio. This term is 
featured in 
1 Ψ   via 
i ρ . These motives for influencing the hours of work of the low-ability 
type has been highlighted in earlier studies (Stiglitz 1982). 
    The second term on the right hand side of equation (41) is a direct consequence of the 
labour market distortion and reflects that for a given labour demand, 
1 L , the number of type 1 
workers employed in sector x can be increased if the hours of work, 
1 l , is reduced (because   27 
1 11 / N Ll = ). This has a direct, positive welfare effect and provides the national government 




 In addition, the labour market distortion also 
affects   because 
1 l  will influence the bargained wage 
i w  (see equation 16). This indirect 
effect is incorporated in 
1 Ψ  via 
i ρ  and provides the government with an incentive to tax 
labour harder (less hard) if 
1 /0
i wl ∂ ∂>   (
1 /0
i wl ∂ ∂<  ). 
    The third term on the right hand side of equation (41) can be interpreted in several ways. 
On one hand, it can be viewed as a tax base effect. If an increase in leisure has a positive 
effect on the (compensated) demand for good x, which leads to higher revenues from 
commodity taxation, this tax motive provides the national government with an incentive to 
increase leisure by implementing a higher marginal income tax rate. On the other hand, 
( )
11 1 // tx z w ∂∂   can also be viewed as compensating the consumer for distortions created by 
the commodity tax. To see this, observe that the government has no direct motive besides 
externality correction to distort the consumption of good x. The components in the tax 
formula for the commodity tax that appear because of self-selection, labour market distortions 
and emission targets only appear in equation (37) because the national government lacks 
direct tax instruments to influence these variables. Therefore, if  0 t ≠  at the optimum, the 
government basically uses marginal income taxation (partly) to compensate the consumers for 
the distortion caused by the commodity tax. If  0 t > , the national government “compensates” 
the consumers by stimulating the consumption of good x. Then, if 
11 /0 xz ∂ ∂>   (
11 /0 xz ∂ ∂<  ) 
this compensation is achieved by stimulating (reducing) leisure via a higher (lower) marginal 
income tax rate. The argument goes in the opposite direction if  0 t < . 
    The last terms influencing the marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type are related 
to the emission targets. These terms, which appear in 
1 Ψ , can be interpreted similarly as the 
corresponding terms in previous sections. Consequently, if 
1 /0 l α ∂ ∂>   (
1 /0 l α ∂ ∂<  ), the 
marginal tax rate for ability type 1 will be reduced (increased). The explanation is that if the 
emission target is relaxed (tightened) when 
1 l  increases, then the national government has an 
incentive to stimulate (reduce) the hours of work by setting a lower (higher) marginal tax on 
labour. A similar argument can be used to interpret the last term in equation (44) which is 
related to the emission target for the other country. As for the marginal income tax rates for 
the high-ability type and the workers in sector c, the terms on the right hand side of equations 
                                                 
16 This has been pointed out by Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b).   28 
(42) and (43) can be interpreted along similar lines as the corresponding terms in equation 
(41). 
    The novelty in Proposition 4 concerns the marginal income tax facing the workers in sector 
c. Equation (43) shows that the national government basically has two motives for setting 
0
c
I T ≠ ; compensating the workers for the distortionary commodity tax and influencing the 
emission targets. Note in particular that the labour market distortion will not explicitly 
influence the design of 
c
I T . This reflects that as long as the workers in sector c have made 
optimal labour supply decisions, a marginal change in their hours of work will have no effect 
on the bargained wage rates in sector x. Another feature is that the self-selection constraint 
will influence the design of the marginal income tax rate for workers in sector c, even though 
the self-selection constraint does not directly apply to this group of workers. The reason is 




  the national government will use the labour income tax as an 
instrument to compensate the workers in sector c for this distortion.  
 
3.3.4 Profit Taxation 
Let us, briefly, consider the profit tax; 
 
Proposition 5: In the context of the decentralized federation, the profit tax implemented by 











ρ κα κ α
γ γγγ
∂ ∂∂∂
= −− − −
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∑       (45) 
 
Observe first that since the firm-owner in this model does not work, the profit tax does not 
distort any labour supply decision, which means that the profit tax, at a first glance, looks like 
a lump-sum tax on the firm-owner. If this would be the case, the marginal cost of public funds 
of such a tax would be equal to one. However, equation (45) shows that four factors will 
cause  /
f
b V γ  to deviate from one. The first is captured by the term  /
ff tx b −∂ ∂  and is a tax 
base effect which can be interpreted along the same lines as the corresponding terms in 
                                                 
17 As long as consumption and leisure are not weakly separable.   29 
equations (41) – (43). The remaining three terms in equation (45) are associated with the 
labour market distortions and the environmental targets and can be given interpretations 




This paper concerns optimal taxation and environmental policy in a decentralized federation 
where there are labour market distortions. The equilibrium features both environmental and 
wage bargaining externalities. The environmental damage is caused by the use of a dirty input 
(energy) in the production, whereas the wage bargaining externality arises as a consequence 
of (the possibility of) firm mobility. The decision making structure in the federation consists 
of one federal government and two national governments. The federal government determines 
environmental targets to be implemented by the national governments. At the national level, 
the governments face a mixed tax problem, where the set of tax instruments consists of a 
nonlinear income tax, a profit tax, and linear commodity and energy taxes. The assumption of 
a decentralized federation means that the national governments recognize, and take into 
account, that they are able to influence the decisions of the federal government. The labour 
market in each country is made up of two sectors; one which is unionized and one which 
functions competitively. 
    The idea is to characterize the incentives influencing the policies determined by a federal 
government and by national governments. The results in this paper suggest that a potentially 
important incentive influencing public policy may be the international wage bargaining 
externality. Since this externality is not internalized at the national level, its presence may 
instead affect the policies at the federal level. Within the framework of this paper, it will 
affect the size of the environmental target determined by the federal government. This has 
implications for the optimal tax structure at the national level. It is shown that the size of the 
environmental tax on the ‘dirty’ input that is chosen by the national government will be 
influenced by the presence of the international wage bargaining externality. However, the 
other taxes determined by the national government will not be influenced by it. In addition, it 
is shown that all domestic taxes, except the environmental tax, will be used by the national 
government as indirect instruments to influence the policy chosen by the federal government. 
    Clearly, there are several possible ways to extend the analysis. For example, it would be 
interesting to allow workers to migrate between countries and analyse whether this added   30 
interaction between countries may create other types of externalities that a federal government 




The Central Government 
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Equations (24), (25) and (27) are readily obtained from (A.4), (A.2) and (A.3). 
 
The National Government 
The first-order conditions corresponding to the national government’s problem can be written 
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To derive equation (31), first invert the conditional indirect utility functions to derive the 
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as well as the following identities 
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Note that this implies 
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Now, use the first order conditions for 
n b  to derive expressions for 
n
b V  to substitute into 
equation (A.28). Then, dividing by γ , using (A.27) and rearranging produces equation (31). 
    Equation (33) is obtained by rearranging  equation (A.15). 
    Equation (34) is obtained by rearranging equation (A.13). 
    Equation (38) is obtained by combining equation (A.14) with equations  (A.5), (A.7), (A.9) and 
(A.11), and solve for t. 
    The marginal income tax rates are obtained by combining the first-order conditions for 
k b  and 
k l , 
for  1, 2, kc = , while equation (45) is readily obtained from equation (A.11). 
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